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Traditional analysis of open developing countries viewed trade and ﬁ-
nancial integrations as two independent margins of openness. Accord-
ingly, trade integration deals with “real issues” related to export orienta-
tion versus import substitution, whereas ﬁnancial integration deals with
“ﬁnancial issues” related to the degree to which the domestic capital mar-
ket is segmented from foreign ones. Yet recent research suggests that the
two margins of openness are interrelated in various hidden channels. Ex-
amples of these links include market pressures through, for example, the
need for trade ﬁnancing and political economy considerations that may
have an impact both on trade ﬂows and through that on the degree of ﬁ-
nancial repression.
The market pressure channel follows the logic of arbitrage—segmenta-
tion implies gaps across borders in relative prices or returns, providing
proﬁtable opportunities. Goods smuggling may be viewed as endogenous
outcome of costly enforcement of commercial policy. Similarly, trade mis-
invoicing may be viewed as an endogenous outcome of costly enforcement
of ﬁnancial segmentation, linking trade and ﬁnancial integrations—in this
case, greater trade openness will increase de facto ﬁnancial openness (see
Aizenman and Noy [2004] for further discussion).
A political economy channel is exempliﬁed by Rajan and Zingales
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Any errors are ours.(2003), who propose an interest group theory of ﬁnancial development
whereby incumbents oppose ﬁnancial development because it breeds com-
petition. In these circumstances, the incumbents’ opposition will be weaker
when an economy allows both cross-border trade and capital ﬂows. They
predict that country’s domestic ﬁnancial development should be positively
correlated with trade openness and identify the time varying nature of this
association.
Other theoretical models that connect trade openness with ﬁnancial fac-
tors also exist. Do and Levchenko (2004, 2006), for example, develop a
two-sector trade model in which one sector is more ﬁnancially intensive,
and cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows depend on the size of this sector. They
conclude that in the country that uses this sector more intensively (the rich
country), opening up to trade will result in more ﬁnancial ﬂows and a
deeper ﬁnancial system (the opposite is true for the other country). Rose
and Spiegel (2004) develop a model of sovereign lending and suggest that
if a credible threat to reductions in trade is what sustains sovereign lending,
then one should observe more lending occurring between countries whose
trade links are stronger. Petersen and Rajan (1997) focus on trade credits
and investigate theoretically and empirically what ﬁrm characteristics will
drive an increased usage of trade credits to ﬁnance trade transactions.
Most papers that do distinguish between diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial
ﬂows, however, do not investigate their impact on trade ﬂows (e.g., Smith
and Valderrama 2006). Several projects, though, focus on the theoretical
links between foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade openness; Swen-
son (2004), for example, examines whether FDI and trade ﬂows are com-
plements or substitutes. She suggests a theory to support her ﬁndings of
complementarities at a high level of data aggregation and substitution
eﬀects at the product level. Aizenman and Noy (2006), on the other hand,
propose a theory of links that describe dynamic complementarities, both
from FDI to trade and from trade to FDI.
A number of recent empirical papers have begun to examine the diﬀer-
ences between the determinants of trade ﬂows and ﬁnancial ﬂows. For ex-
ample, Eaton and Tamura (1994) compare the determinants of Japanese
and U.S. trade and foreign investment, while Guerin (2006) compares a
gravity model for trade with similar gravity models for FDI and portfolio
ﬂows. Guerin (2006) builds on a growing literature that uses gravity mod-
els to empirically examine the determinants of ﬁnancial ﬂows focusing ex-
clusively on FDI and portfolio ﬂows (e.g., Portes, Rey, and Oh 2001; Razin,
Rubinstein, and Sadka 2003; Wei 2000).1 Interestingly, these papers typi-
cally do not examine the links between the ﬁnancial ﬂows and trade ﬂows
but rather compare their determinants and ﬁnd similar speciﬁcations ﬁt
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1. For a survey of this literature, see Blonigen (2005).both trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. Another branch in this literature examines
the joint eﬀect of both ﬁnancial and trade ﬂows on a third variable as, for
example, in Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2006) investigation of their im-
pact on output growth volatility. A diﬀerent strand investigates and com-
pares the determinants of diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial ﬂows without inves-
tigating their relationship to trade ﬂows (e.g., Daude and Fratzscher 2006).
A recent survey of the literature on ﬁnancial openness and its causes and
eﬀects is Kose et al. (2006).
In recent works we have looked at the degree to which the data is consis-
tent with the presence of two-way feedbacks between trade and ﬁnan-
cial openness. We adopted a reduced form approach, where we tested the
presence of two-way intertemporal linkages between trade and ﬁnancial 
de facto openness. The results are reported in Aizenman and Noy (2004),
where we conﬁrm the presence of almost symmetric intertemporal feed-
backs between trade and ﬁnancial openness and in Aizenman and Noy
(2006), where we report signiﬁcant intertemporal feedbacks for FDI and
goods trade. Following Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine’s (2002) distinc-
tion between market liberalization (de jure) and market integration (de
facto), we also found asymmetric importance of de jure measures of open-
ness—trade policy has a robust eﬀect on trade openness, but ﬁnancial re-
strictions seem to have no signiﬁcant impact on de facto ﬁnancial openness.
This paper extends our previous analysis—having established the pres-
ence of strong two-way intertemporal feedbacks between trade and ﬁnan-
cial openness, we now examine the strength of the intertemporal feedbacks
between disaggregated measures of trade and ﬁnancial openness in devel-
oping countries. Speciﬁcally, we disaggregate the current account into trade
in goods (split between manufacturing, metals/ores, fuel, and foodstuﬀs),
services, and income. Similarly, we disaggregated the ﬁnancial account
into FDI, loans, equity, and trade credit. Such disaggregation provides us
with more detailed information about the possible channels at work.
Among the interesting patterns we uncover, we observe systematic
changes between the 1980s and the 1990s. Most ﬁnancial ﬂows in and out
of developing countries have taken the form of loans. Yet these ﬁnancial
ﬂows are the only type of ﬂows that have decreased between the two de-
cades. We thus see a growing importance to developing countries of port-
folio ﬂows and especially of FDI. The trade statistics do not present a clear
temporal trend toward an increase from the 1980s to the 1990s. While ser-
vices trade has increased, goods trade has seen a corresponding decrease.
Once the information for trade in goods is disaggregated by type of good,
we observe that manufacturing trade has increased dramatically, while
trade in fuels has seen a dramatic decline as percent of domestic output. In-
vestigating the patterns of the correlation coeﬃcients between disaggre-
gated ﬁnancial openness measures and the trade openness measures re-
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vices trade and a very strong correlation between openness to trade in
goods and trade in services.
Next, we looked at the impact of lagged disaggregated trade on disag-
gregated ﬁnancial measures, allowing for macroeconomic controls. While
past average trade in goods appears to be correlated with FDI and loan
ﬂows, this is not the case for the equity and trade credits measures. Trade
in incomes is positively correlated with FDI, reﬂecting the repatriation of
proﬁts from foreign investments. Interestingly, and less expectedly, trade in
services is negatively correlated with all the four measures of ﬁnancial
ﬂows—while it is statistically signiﬁcant only for the FDI and equity mea-
sures. For the subaccounts for goods trade, we observe that trade in food-
stuﬀs is positive and statistically important for FDI ﬂows, as is the measure
for metals/ores trade. We conclude by tracing the reversed link—the im-
pact of lagged disaggregated ﬁnancial on disaggregated trade measures, al-
lowing for the same macroeconomic controls. Interestingly, gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita is negatively correlated with trade openness for
goods and services (with the coeﬃcient for goods trade three times as big
as the one for services). We also observe a positive coeﬃcient for the bud-
get surplus, the inﬂation measure, the U.S. interest rate and the degree of
democracy. In all those results, the control variables are more strongly as-
sociated with goods trade than with trade in services. Corruption is nega-
tively and signiﬁcantly associated with goods trade. Foreign direct invest-
ment openness is associated with trade openness, with the impact twice as
large for goods trade than for trade in services. This impact is also much
larger than the other various measures of ﬁnancial openness (equity, loans,
and trade credits). The coeﬃcients on loan ﬂows are negatively and typi-
cally statistically signiﬁcant, while equity ﬂows are positively associated
only with goods trade. The measure of trade credits is never statistically
signiﬁcant.
Section 1.2 describes the data, section 1.3 discusses the methodology
and results in more detail, and section 1.4 concludes.
1.2 Data
We include all nondeveloped countries and territories for which all data
are available in the 2001 edition of the World Bank’s World Development In-
dicators. Most of the data on the ﬁnancial subaccounts are typically avail-
able only from the early 1980s, while the political data we require is avail-
able only up to 1998. Our data set, therefore, covers the years 1982 to 1998.
Blonigen and Wang (2004), among others, argue that pooling developed
and developing countries in empirical studies of this type is inappropriate
and likely to lead to misleading results. In previous work, we also found
that industrialized/developed countries appear to be diﬀerent from devel-
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(Aizenman and Noy 2006). For example, FDI inﬂows into developed
countries might be mostly of horizontal FDI, while those into developing
countries might be of vertical FDI. We thus focus our empirical investiga-
tion on developing countries only.
The developed economies deleted from the set are those economies that
were members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) in 1990. We also exclude island economies from our esti-
mations as these are often used as oﬀshore banking centers, and their level
of de facto openness to ﬁnancial ﬂows is often dramatically diﬀerent from
other countries with similar income levels. The sixty countries included in
the data set are Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ivory
Coast, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala,
Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Ko-
rea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nica-
ragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,
the Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swazi-
land, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Our sample is further restricted by the
availability of data for some years.
We measure gross ﬁnancial ﬂows (de facto ﬁnancial openness) as the
sum of total capital inﬂows and outﬂows (in absolute values) measured as
a percent of GDP. Capital ﬂows are the sum of FDI, portfolio ﬂows, trade
credits, and loans. We construct an openness index for each one of these
four components and brieﬂy describe them in the following. The data on ﬁ-
nancial ﬂows is taken from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s)
Balance of Payments Statistics data set and are exactly analogous to the
standard measure of commercial openness (sum of exports and imports as
percent of GDP).
We subdivide the standard measure of commercial openness into open-
ness for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade in incomes following the
classiﬁcation adopted by the World Bank.2 We further divide trade in
goods into openness measures for trade in foodstuﬀs, in fuel, in manufac-
turing, and in metals/ores. This data is from the World Bank’s World De-
velopment Indicators. We provide descriptive statistics in tables 1.1 to 1.3.
Table 1.1 presents averages for ﬁnancial and trade openness for the
1980s and 1990s across geographical regions, while table 1.2 presents the ﬁ-
nancial and trade openness indexes disaggregated by type (FDI, loans,
Links between Trade and Finance: A Disaggregated Analysis 13
2. Trade in income (net income) “refers to receipts and payments of employee compensa-
tion for nonresident workers, and investment income (receipts and payments on direct in-
vestment, portfolio investment, and other investments and receipts on reserve assets).” World
Bank Development Indicators 2005. For a skeptical discussion of the measurement of trade in
services, see Lipsey (2006).trade credits, and equity ﬂows for the ﬁnancial measures and goods, ser-
vices, and incomes for the trade measures). A number of noteworthy ob-
servations are obtained from these tables, summarized in ﬁgure 1.1. First,
the degree of ﬁnancial and trade openness is universally larger during the
1990s than it was in the previous decade, although the degree of diﬀerence
diﬀers substantially across geographical regions. The OECD countries and
the countries of East Asia were the most open to ﬁnancial ﬂows, and the
least ﬁnancially open groups are sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) countries, and South Asia.
Secondly, when ﬁnancial openness is disaggregated by type, we observe
that most ﬁnancial ﬂows in and out of developing countries have taken the
form of loans. Yet these ﬁnancial ﬂows are the only type of ﬂows that have
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Table 1.1 Openness—Descriptive statistics by region
Financial openness Trade openness
1980s 1990s 1980s 1990s
Developing countries 5.43 8.63 56.1 60.9
OECD countries 9.31 16.79 73.0 70.3
East Asia 8.47 16.53 55.9 72.0
Latin America 6.05 8.15 60.9 64.0
Othera 4.89 7.10 54.6 58.9
All 6.96 10.35 58.4 61.8
aOther includes Africa (north and sub-Saharan), the Middle East, and South Asia.




Trade credits 1.49 1.68
Portfolio ﬂows 1.18 2.20
Loans 5.97 5.44
Trade openness
Trade in incomes 9.14 9.07
Trade in services 20.79 22.76





Sources: Data for ﬁnancial ﬂows is from the Balance-of-Payments Statistics. Data for trade
ﬂows is from the World Development Indicators.
Note: The table presents averages of sum of inﬂows of outﬂows (by types) as percent of GDP.decreased between the two decades. We thus see a growing importance to
developing countries and portfolio ﬂows and especially of FDI. The trade
statistics do not present a clear temporal trend toward an increase from the
1980s to the 1990s. While services trade has increased (from about 21 per-
cent to 23 percent of GDP), goods trade has seen a corresponding decrease
(from about 66 percent to 62 percent). Once the information for trade in
goods is disaggregated by type of good, we observe that manufacturing
trade has increased dramatically (from 29 percent to 39 percent), while
trade in fuels has seen a dramatic decline (from 24 percent to 10 percent 
of GDP).3
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Table 1.3 Correlations for trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows by type
Equity Trade Loan FDI Trade Trade in Trade in 
ﬂows credits ﬂows ﬂows goods services incomes
Equity ﬂows 1 0.06 0.40 0.23 0.21 0.23 0.26
Trade credits 1 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.02
Loan ﬂows 1 0.15 0.13 0.21 0.72
FDI ﬂows 1 0.60 0.55 0.22
Trade in goods 1 0.87 0.30
Trade in services 1 0.38
Trade in incomes 1
Fig. 1.1 Openness Indexes
3. At the very least, part of the reason for this decline is average lower oil prices during the
1990s. The ﬁgures for trade in foodstuﬀs and in metals/ores were fairly constant between the
two decades.Table 1.3 presents correlation coeﬃcients between the ﬁnancial open-
ness measures and the trade openness measures disaggregated by types of
ﬂows. The notable correlations are a signiﬁcant correlation of FDI ﬂow
measures with goods and services trade (0.60 and 0.55, respectively) and a
very strong correlation between openness to trade in goods and trade in
services (0.87).
Because results from all the estimation procedures described in the fol-
lowing will be biased if any of the relevant series has a unit root, we are also
required to establish stationarity. We conduct the common Phillips-Perron
(1981) test for unit roots for the ﬁnancial openness variables as well as the
trade openness measures. Results are presented in table 1.4. We easily re-
ject the existence of unit root in all cases.
In our multivariate estimations, we include several control variables that
are described in the following. This list is based on our previous research
on ﬁnancial openness (Aizenman and Noy 2004). In order to ensure our
results are not driven by a ‘missing variables’ bias, we include a host of
macroeconomic control variables. In all regressions we use per capita GDP
(measured in PPP dollars), a domestic interest rate spread (from a world
rate of interest),4 and a weighted average of G3 growth rates. In an initial
speciﬁcation, we also included the government’s budget surplus (as percent
of GDP), the inﬂation rate (CPI), a world interest rate (U.S. one-year T-bill
rate), GDP (in $1995), and government consumption (as percent of GDP).
None of these were signiﬁcant, and all were dropped from the speciﬁca-
tions we report. The macroeconomic data are taken from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators and the International Monetary Fund’s In-
ternational Finance Statistics. Details are in the appendix.
For the political-economy determinants of ﬁnancial openness, we in-
clude in our empirical investigation two political and institutional mea-
sures, an index of the political regime in place, and a measure of corrup-
tion. Our democracy index is taken from the Polity IV project and ranges
from –10 (fully autocratic) to  10 (fully democratic).5 In addition, follow-
ing the work of Wei (2000) and Dreher and Siemers (2003), we examine
whether corruption matters for the degree of openness. We use a measure
of corruption that is taken from the International Country Risk Guide. The
data are available in monthly observations. We obtain annual observations
from 1982 onward by averaging the monthly data points for each year. This
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4. We measure the spread between a domestic deposit rate and the IMF’s special drawing
rights (SDRs) interest.
5. The “Polity IV database includes annual measures for both institutionalized democracy
(DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC). A third indicator, POLITY, is derived simply by sub-
tracting the AUTOC value from the DEMOC value; this procedure provides a single regime
score that ranges from  10 (full democracy) to –10 (full autocracy)” (Marshall and Jaggers
2000, 12). We use the POLITY variable in our regressions. For further discussion, see Aizen-
man and Noy (2004).index ranges from –6 (low probability/risk of encountering corruption) to
0 (high risk of corruption).6
As the theoretical discussion in Aizenman and Noy (2004) suggests, one
of the determinants of de facto ﬁnancial openness should be the legal im-
pediments to ﬁnancial ﬂows (de jure ﬁnancial openness). Accordingly, we
also include in our multivariate analysis a binary measure for restrictions
on the capital account taken from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.7
1.3 Methodology and Results
1.3.1 Causality from Trade to Capital Flows
In order to investigate whether past trade openness Granger-causes FDI
gross ﬂows, we start by positing a linear structure for the determination of
the level of ﬁnancial openness, whereby8
(1) FOit
Q    i    1Xit    2C  O  T   i  t     1    εit.
The dependent variable (FOit
Q), ﬁnancial openness for country i at time t
and type Q (FDI, loans, trade credits or equity), is assumed to be depend-
ent on separate country intercepts, a vector Xit of macroeconomic and
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Note: The table lists the z-statistic for ρ.
***Denotes statistical rejection of the unit-root hypothesis. All rejections are signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level.
6. Two other political variables that were initially included but later dropped due to their
insigniﬁcance were a measure of political risk (from the International Country Risk Guide
data) and a measure of government unity (taken from the World Bank’s Database of Political
Institutions 2000).
7. This binary measure is the only internationally comparable measure of de jure ﬁnancial
openness available for a large sample of countries and over the entire sample period. Ideally,
separate measures for the degree of de jure openness of the capital account to the various
types of ﬂows (FDI, loans, equity ﬂows, etc.) should be used. These are unavailable for his-
torical data.
8. See Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) for a deﬁnition of G-causality.political and institutional control variables, a vector of average lagged
trade openness measure (C  O  T   i  t  –    1  ) for country i, time t and type T (goods,
services, etc.), and an error term. The null hypothesis that we investigate,
in this case, is that past trade openness (in goods, services, and incomes)
has no observed causal eﬀect on the diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial ﬂows.
Because we do not ﬁnd any evidence of autocorrelation, lagged values of
FOit
Q are not included in the model’s speciﬁcation. In order to examine the
suitability of ﬁxed versus random assumption for the country-speciﬁc
eﬀects, we examine the standard Hausman chi-square statistic for the
benchmark regressions. The statistic, at 28.5, 16.1, 39.6 and 40.3 for col-
umns (1) to (4) of table 1.5, reject the null of uncorrelated errors necessary
for an unbiased random-eﬀects estimation. We therefore conduct all esti-
mations with a ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation.
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Table 1.5 Estimation of various ﬁnancial openness indexes
FDI (1) Loans (2) Equity (3) Trade credits (4)
Per capita GDP 0.44*** 0.58* 0.46*** 0.15***
(5.80) (1.66) (2.94) (2.87)
Budget surplus (% of GDP) –0.01 –0.09 –0.01 0.01
(0.47) (1.26) (0.28) (1.17)
Inﬂation (CPI) 0.04 –0.28** –0.01 0.01
(1.32) (2.21) (0.15) (0.53)
U.S. Treasury bill rate 0.03 0.38 –0.10 0.12***
(0.48) (1.32) (0.69) (2.51)
Democratic regime –0.02 –0.34** –0.06 –0.01
(0.47) (2.37) (0.79) (0.30)
Corruption 0.12 0.45 0.06 0.09
(0.81) (0.64) (0.17) (0.85)
The 1990s 0.43 2.55** 0.85 –0.06
(1.50) (1.99) (1.24) (0.26)
Trade openness in:a
Services –0.11*** –0.09 –0.20** –0.03
(3.22) (0.57) (2.21) (1.16)
Incomes 0.02** –0.03 0.01 0.01
(1.94) (0.58) (0.40) (0.88)
Goods 0.02*** 0.36*** 0.00 0.00
(3.60) (11.95) (0.17) (0.96)
Estimated autocorrelation 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.02
No. of observations 652 723 472 378
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.48 0.28 0.59
Notes: t-statistics for all variables are given in parentheses. The LHS variable is the sum of ﬁnancial in-
ﬂows and outﬂows by type (as percent of GDP). Estimation using least squares with country-ﬁxed ef-
fects. For deﬁnitions of variables, see appendix.
aAverage for t – 1, . . . t – 4.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.The adjusted R2 in table 1.5 is between 0.28 and 0.59; these depend on
the speciﬁc dependent ﬁnancial openness indicator used with estimation
having the highest explanatory power for the FDI and trade credits regres-
sions (columns [1] and [4]). For our control variables in table 1.5, we ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcient for per capita GDP is always positive and statistically
signiﬁcant—that is, an increase in domestic per capita GDP of PPP$1000
will facilitate 0.15 to 0.58 percentage points increase in the volume of gross
ﬁnancial ﬂows (as percent of GDP) with the weakest impact for trade cred-
its. The coeﬃcient for the budget surplus is typically negative but never sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. Inﬂation appears to play a statistically signiﬁcant role
only in its impact on openness to loans (a higher inﬂation implies less loan
ﬂows). The U.S. interest rate appears to have a signiﬁcantly positive aﬀect
only on trade credit ﬂows, while the political nature of the governing
regime impacts loan ﬂows. Corruption is always statistically insigniﬁcant
(this is an interesting result as corruption was statistically correlated with
aggregate ﬁnancial openness as reported in Aizenman and Noy [2004]). A
dummy variable for the 1990s is positive and signiﬁcant for loans estima-
tion (column [2]). Almost all of the results described in the preceding for
the control variables in table 1.5 also hold for the estimations presented in
table 1.6—the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients are very similar and only oc-
casionally do the signiﬁcance levels change.
For our variables of interest, the trade openness measures for trade in
services, incomes, and goods, the results for the diﬀerent dependent vari-
ables (the ﬁnancial openness measures) are quite diﬀerent. While past av-
erage trade in goods appears to be correlated with FDI and loan ﬂows, this
is not the case for the equity and trade credits measures. Trade in incomes
is positively correlated with FDI—this is not surprising as part of this mea-
sure included the repatriation of proﬁts from foreign investments. Interest-
ingly, and less expectedly, trade in services is negatively correlated with all
the four measures of ﬁnancial ﬂows—while it is statistically signiﬁcant
only for the FDI and equity measures.
In table 1.6, we separate our measure of goods trade into openness mea-
sures for trade in foodstuﬀs, fuels, metals/ores, and manufacturing. As re-
ported before, the other macroeconomic and political control variables 
are also included in these speciﬁcations, and the results are consistent with
the previous table. The explanation of the model improves somewhat with
the model best explaining FDI openness (an R2 of 0.65).
In table 1.6, we observe that the result for trade in services remains neg-
ative, while the result for trade in incomes changes somewhat with statisti-
cal signiﬁcance now only apparent for the loans measure. For the subac-
counts for goods trade, we observe that trade in foodstuﬀs is positive and
statistically important for FDI ﬂows, as is the measure for metals/ores
trade. The trade in fuels measure is statistically signiﬁcant and negative for
the FDI and loans measures. This is unsurprising considering fuel’s role as
an input in the production process and the high variability of its price.
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We already suggested that causality might also run from past ﬁnancial
openness to present trade openness, and we therefore estimate the oppo-
site speciﬁcation:
(2) COit
T      1Xit    2F   O   Q
it 1    it,
where the dependent variable is now the trade openness index (for goods
or services), while on the independent variables are the set of control and
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Table 1.6 Estimation of various ﬁnancial openness indexes: Subaccounts for goods trade
FDI (1) Loans (2) Equity (3) Trade credits (4)
Per capita GDP 0.30*** 0.49 0.50** 0.06
(2.72) (0.85) (1.99) (0.91)
Budget surplus (% of GDP) –0.03 –0.05 0.01 0.11
(1.22) (0.40) (0.17) (0.48)
Inﬂation (CPI) –0.03 –0.36** –0.02 –0.02
(0.87) (2.04) (0.25) (0.72)
U.S. Treasury bill rate 0.00 0.49 –0.06 0.17***
(0.05) (1.13) (0.31) (3.11)
Democratic regime –0.05 –0.52*** –0.08 –0.03
(1.23) (2.70) (0.91) (0.74)
Corruption 0.21 1.29 0.12 0.11
(1.07) (1.25) (0.27) (0.86)
The 1990s 0.71** 2.55 1.00 –0.20
(1.97) (1.38) (1.14) (0.87)
Trade openness in:a
Services –0.17*** –0.21 –0.17 0.04
(3.57) (0.86) (1.35) (1.02)
Incomes 0.01 0.34*** 0.01 –0.01**
(0.81) (9.07) (0.51) (2.50)
Goods
Foodstuffs 0.25*** 0.51 0.04 –0.02
(3.49) (1.50) (0.18) (0.40)
Fuel –0.11*** –0.29** –0.01 –0.04
(4.07) (2.15) (0.18) (1.36)
Metals/ores 0.30** 1.02 0.10 –0.25*
(2.40) (1.51) (0.26) (1.81)
Manufacturing 0.02 –0.01 –0.01 0.02
(1.47) (0.15) (0.14) (1.25)
Estimated autocorrelation 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.12
No. of observations 490 522 395 261
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.48 0.26 0.49
Note: See table 1.5 notes.
aAverage for t – 1, . . . t – 4.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.various measures of average past (last four years) of ﬁnancial openness
(FDI, loans, equity, and trade credits). The measures for trade credits and
portfolio ﬂows are not reported for many countries, so we subsequently
drop them in the speciﬁcations reported in columns (2) and (4) and thus in-
crease the sample size signiﬁcantly. We use the same assumptions, method-
ology, deﬁnition of variables, and samples as before. Results are reported
in table 1.7.
Interestingly, in all the speciﬁcations for table 1.7, GDP per capita is
negatively correlated with trade openness for goods and services (with the
coeﬃcient for goods trade three times as big as the one for services). Be-
sides that we observe a positive coeﬃcient for the budget surplus, the in-
ﬂation measure, the U.S. interest rate, and the degree of democracy. In all
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Table 1.7 Reverse speciﬁcations
Services (1) Services (2) Goods (3) Goods (4)
Per capita GDP –0.40*** –0.38*** –1.44*** –1.44***
(2.31) (3.00) (2.90) (4.23)
Budget surplus (% GDP) 0.01* 0.00 0.03* 0.00
(1.72) (0.25) (1.63) (0.45)
Inﬂation (CPI) 0.06 0.14*** 0.35* 0.62***
(0.85) (2.92) (1.62) (4.87)
U.S. Treasury bill rate 0.06 0.04 0.92* 0.52*
(0.34) (0.39) (1.72) (1.79)
Democratic regime 0.13 0.08* 1.79*** 0.81***
(1.28) (1.60) (6.27) (5.93)
Corruption 0.57 –0.11 –3.80*** –1.82***
(1.52) (0.43) (3.50) (2.68)
The 1990s 1.46* 1.55*** 3.31 5.87***
(1.59) (3.34) (1.26) (4.70)
Financial openness in:a
FDI 0.67*** 0.05 1.36* 1.80***
(2.54) (0.39) (1.80) (4.94)
Loans 0.00 –0.04** –0.50*** –0.38***
(0.03) (2.10) (7.06) (7.92)
Equity –0.03 0.63**
(0.32) (2.05)
Trade credits –0.49 0.18
(0.86) (0.11)
Estimated autocorrelation 0.84 0.58 0.55 0.56
No. of observations 192 620 192 620
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.96
Note: See table 1.5 notes.
aAverage t – 1, . . . t – 4.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.those results, the control variables are more strongly associated with goods
trade than with trade in services. Corruption is negatively and signiﬁcantly
associated with goods trade, while trade openness is higher for the 1990s
also in a multivariate framework.
For our variables of interest, perhaps unsurprisingly FDI openness is
again associated with trade openness, with the impact twice as large for
goods trade. This impact is also much larger than the other various mea-
sures of ﬁnancial openness (equity, loans, and trade credits). The coeﬃ-
cients on loan ﬂows are negatively and typically statistically signiﬁcant,
while equity ﬂows is positively associated only with goods trade. The mea-
sure of trade credits is never statistically signiﬁcant.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we studied the intertemporal feedbacks between disaggre-
gated measures of trade and ﬁnancial openness. Our results are consistent
with the notion that, for many developing countries in recent years, there
has been an increase in FDI ﬂows and trade in manufacturing and services
and that these are linked. Overall, the increase in ﬁnancial openness we ob-
serve has also been associated with a decline of the importance of loans
and an increase in the importance of equity and FDI ﬂows. As the increase
in ﬁnancial openness is positively associated with GDP per capita, the pos-
itive association between greater ﬁnancial openness and the increase in 
the importance of equity relatively to loans is consistent with Diamond
(1984).9Somewhat surprisingly, we failed to detect the importance of trade
credit, potentially because of underreporting—especially when trade cred-
its are associated with imports that are ﬁnanced by foreign producers.10
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9. Diamond’s (1984) approach explains the role of bank intermediation in ﬁnancing capi-
tal formation in the presence of signiﬁcant monitoring costs, showing the optimality of issu-
ing unmonitored debt, which is subject to liquidation costs. The delegated monitor is a ﬁnan-
cial intermediary because it borrows from small investors (depositors), using unmonitored
debt (deposits) to lend to borrowers (whose loans it monitors).
10. See Petersen and Rajan (1997) for further analysis of the possibility that trade credit are
supplied by the party that has better access to the capital market.References
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Appendix
Table 1A.1 Data sources
Variable Description Source
KTOTAL Sum of capital inﬂows and outﬂows (% of GDP) IMF-BOP statistics
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EQTOT Sum of portfolio inﬂows and outﬂows (% of GDP) IMF-BOP statistics
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SERVG Sum of service exports and imports (% of GDP) WB-WDI
GOODG Sum of goods exports and imports (% of GDP) WB-WDI
INCOMG Sum of trade in incomes (% of GDP) WB-WDI
FUELG Sum of trade in fuels (% of GDP) WB-WDI
MANUG Sum of trade in manufacturing (% of GDP) WB-WDI
FOODG Sum of trade in footstuffs (% of GDP) WB-WDI
METALG Sum of trade in metals and ores (% of GDP) WB-WDI
GDPPCPP GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) WB-WDI
DLCPI Inﬂation, consumer prices (annual %) WB-WDI
BDGTG Overall budget deﬁcit (% of GDP) WB-WDI
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CORRUPT Level of corruptiona PRS: International 
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Comment Maria Cristina Terra
This paper investigates empirically the interrelations between disaggre-
gated measures of trade and ﬁnancial openness. Trade ﬂows are disaggre-
gated into services, incomes, and goods, with a further disaggregation of
goods ﬂows into foodstuﬀs, fuel, metal/ores, and manufacturing. Finan-
cial openness, on its turn, is disaggregated into foreign direct investment
(FDI), loans, equity, and trade credits. Each of these ﬁnancial ﬂow mea-
sures is regressed onto an average of four lagged periods of the trade mea-
sures and a set of macroeconomic and political variables used as controls.
Analogously, trade in goods and in services are used alternatively as de-
pendent variables in regressions using the same controls as the ﬁnancial
openness regressions, but including the lagged averages of the ﬁnancial
openness measures.
The paper uncovers some interesting feedback patterns between disag-
gregated trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. It is very interesting the captured im-
pact of past trade in goods on the FDI and loans ﬂow and its lack of im-
pact on the equity and trade credits measures. Also interesting is the fact
that trade in income has a signiﬁcant impact only on FDI.
The authors substantially revised their original work, for this is a very
diﬀerent paper from the one on which I commented in the conference. The
original paper included two models to motivate the two-way feedbacks be-
tween ﬁnancial and trade openness, and the empirical investigation was
based only on aggregate measures of the trade and ﬁnancial openness vari-
ables. Most of my comments on the original paper questioned whether the
models chosen really captured the most relevant aspects of trade and ﬁ-
nancial openness issues concerning developing economies. They also dis-
cussed the link between the models presented and the empirical investiga-
tion carried out in the paper.
The authors chose to suppress the theoretical models from the paper and
to focus on the empirical study. A theoretical framework, however, is cru-
cial to guide the choice of control variables. Without it, the paper lacks a
justiﬁcation for the chosen empirical formulation, which also impairs the
interpretation of the results. This seems especially important in this case,
as most of the control variables coeﬃcients turned out to be not signiﬁcant.
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Vargas, Rio de Janeiro, and executive director of the Brazilian Society of Econometrics.For example, per capita GDP has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on
trade credits and on loans in the regression with aggregated trade ﬂows in
goods, but the coeﬃcient becomes zero when trade in goods is disaggre-
gated. Were the regressions based on a theoretical framework, maybe we
could have some hint on how to interpret this intriguing result.
All the regressions estimated, each one using a diﬀerent disaggregated
measure of trade and ﬁnancial openness as dependent variables, use the
same macro and political variables as controls. A theoretical model could
indicate whether one should use diﬀerent control variables for the diﬀerent
types of ﬂows. As an example, the degree of ﬁnancial deepening of an econ-
omy, a variable that was not included in the regressions, may have an im-
pact on the magnitude of the ﬁnancial ﬂows, but no eﬀect on the size of
trade ﬂows.
The original version of the paper had included variables of trade and ﬁ-
nancial restrictions in the regressions. This yielded the interesting result
that the de jure restrictions on trade aﬀected trade volumes, while those on
ﬁnancial transactions had no impact on ﬁnancial ﬂows. Unfortunately,
these variables were not included in this new version.
Given that the objective of the paper is to explore the two-way feedbacks
between trade and ﬁnancial openness, it would be useful to have a frame-
work that explored their channels. Here are some of the possible links that
could be explored. On the one hand, FDI may foster trade in goods when
it generates intraﬁrm trade between the subsidiaries of a multinational
company or when a company chooses one country to concentrate produc-
tion, trading ﬁnal goods and inputs the others. On the other hand, trade 
in goods may provide the collateral for ﬁnancial transactions, thereby en-
couraging more ﬁnancial ﬂows. Note that the very trade in goods does 
generate ﬁnancial transactions, given that trade is not based on goods’ ex-
changes. Finally, the fact that countries with higher international trade
have higher stakes in international markets improves the expectations
about a sound interaction between the government and the international
ﬁnancial market. This should also yield trade as an engine to promote
more ﬁnancial transactions.
Comment Thierry Verdier
The purpose of this paper is to consider empirically the relationships be-
tween various disaggregated measures of trade and ﬁnancial openness in
developing countries and to show that there are important two-way causal-
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gated into services, incomes, and goods (with a further disaggregation into
foodstuﬀs, fuel, metal/ores, and manufacturing). On the other hand, ﬁ-
nancial openness is disaggregated into foreign direct investment (FDI),
loans, equity, and trade credits. The authors provide ﬁrst regressions of
each of these ﬁnancial ﬂow measures on an average of four lagged periods
of the trade measures, controlling for standard macroeconomic variables
(per capita GDP, budget surplus, inﬂation, U.S. Treasury bill rate) and
some political or governance variables (index of democratic regime, cor-
ruption). The authors then consider the reverse causality from ﬁnancial
ﬂows to trade ﬂows and, therefore, analogously regress trade ﬂows in
goods and services on the lagged averages of the ﬁnancial openness mea-
sures, using the same macroeconomic and political controls as in the ﬁ-
nancial openness regressions.
Doing this, the authors discuss interesting causality patterns between
trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows. Most notable is the fact that past trade in services
has a negative eﬀect on FDI ﬂows, while trade in goods has a positive im-
pact on FDI ﬂows. As well (and quite surprisingly), there is no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of past trade ﬂows on equity and trade credits measures (see tables
1.5 and 1.6). On the other hand, past FDI ﬂows have a positive eﬀect on
trade in services and goods, while past loans ﬂows, on the contrary, seem
to aﬀect negatively current trade ﬂows in goods and services (table 1.7).
This current piece of work is a very diﬀerent paper from the one that was
presented (and commented on!) in the conference. The original paper in-
cluded an important theoretical section (with two models motivating the
interactions between ﬁnancial and trade openness) and an empirical sec-
tion based on aggregate measures of the trade and ﬁnancial openness vari-
ables for least-developed countries (LDC) and developed economies. Be-
cause of this, the comments I made on the original paper were focused on
addressing the positive dimensions and the limits of the theoretical ap-
proach illustrating some channels of interactions between trade and ﬁnan-
cial openness. Then I was also discussing the links between the theoretical
models and the empirical part of the paper.
In the current version, there is no theoretical framework and the paper
is essentially about an empirical discussion of the relationships for devel-
oping countries between trade and ﬁnancial ﬂows at some disaggregated
level. Let me say that I feel a bit disappointed by the new orientation of the
paper. While I clearly recognize the eﬀort to consider more disaggregated
ﬂow variables and uncover interesting results, I remain somewhat frus-
trated not to have an adequate theoretical framework to tell me a story pro-
viding an interpretation of these results.
As a matter of fact, many correlations provided by the regressions re-
main without much economic explanation. For instance, why is it that
trade in services aﬀects negatively FDI ﬂows (table 1.6), while on the con-
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1.7)? As well, why is it that trade ﬂows do not seem to have an eﬀect on
trade credits nor that trade credits have an eﬀect on trade ﬂows? Clearly,
the paper would have gained much with a theoretical framework providing
an interpretation of these puzzling results.
Similarly, a theoretical approach would have been useful to assess the sig-
niﬁcance and causality of some of the control variables used in some of the
regressions. For instance, corruption seems to aﬀect negatively trade ﬂows
in goods (table 1.7), but can’t we explain this result by some reverse causal-
ity that less trade in goods implies less competition in the domestic markets
and therefore more corruption (as emphasized, for example, by Ades and
Di Tella in their work on the links between trade and corruption)?
Finally, a theoretical framework could have provided interesting av-
enues to discuss the policy implications of the two-way causality uncovered
here between trade ﬂows and ﬁnancial ﬂows. The usual presumption is that
trade integration is good (because of the associated gains from trade inside
the country), while ﬁnancial integration may bring instability and volatil-
ity problems. Hence, one should have “free trade” and controls on capital
accounts. Related to this, however, people have this whole discussion on
the degree of eﬀectiveness of controls on trade ﬂows versus ﬁnancial ﬂows
and the diﬀerence between de jure and de facto restrictions. The present
paper suggests that it might indeed be diﬃcult to separate trade integration
from ﬁnancial integration, generating therefore interesting trade-oﬀs on
the policy to adopt for international integration. A conceptual framework
to assess normatively these dimensions is certainly something that needs to
be done to fully appreciate the importance of the “nonseparability” be-
tween trade ﬂows and ﬁnancial ﬂows.
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